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Canada’s Prohibition of Automated Bank Machine Withdrawal 
Charges as a Violation of the WTO’s GATS 
 
by David Collins* 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
Much has been made recently of Canada’s transgression of its international 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and (less spectacularly) the UN Convention on 
the Control of Narcotic Drugs raising concern that Canada is no longer emblematic of 
the concerned world citizen. This image may be further tainted by another 
administrative directive from the Canadian cabinet this year that could violate the 
nation’s key international commitment to liberalize trade.  The Canadian Minister of 
Finance announced in January of 2007 the planned intention to change the Federal 
Bank Act1 to require that banks operating in Canada cease imposing service charges 
for cash withdrawals at automated banking machines.  This measure may violate 
international obligations, depending on what form the regulation ultimately takes if  
implemented, because while the prohibition appears directed at Canada’s largest 
domestic banks it could also adversely affect foreign banks operating in Canada.  This 
article will illustrate that the enforced elimination of bank service charges, although 
commendably aimed at protecting consumers from corporate gouging, may represent 
a violation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (‘GATS’) to which Canada 
is committed as a member of the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’).  This article 
will examine in what way this putative regulation, and various potential modifications 
of it, may breach the GATS should they come into force.  This article will not 
consider any implications that may be engaged under competition law or contract law 
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relating to unfair terms, nor will it evaluate this regulation in light of the North 
American Agreement on Free Trade or the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development Code on the Liberalization of Capital Markets.  It is helpful to 
begin with a brief outline of the planned measure and the debate it has stirred. 
 
II    AUTOMATED BANK MACHINE SERVICE CHARGES 
Canadians paid an estimated $420 million in automated bank machine withdrawal 
fees in 2006, a year when the earnings of these banks was over $19 billion2 (source 
Statistics Canada).   In 2005 there were over 15,000 automated banking machines 
across Canada accounting for over 1 billion transactions.3  Individual service charges 
are usually between $1 and $2 per transaction, with higher fees imposed when 
withdrawing from a machine belonging to a financial institution other than the one in 
which the customer’s account is kept.  Federal Bill C-37 tabled to modify the Bank 
Act which regulates the banking industry in Canada contains only one consumer 
protection measure and does not address the issue of high service charges imposed on 
Canadian customers.  Such charges are not imposed by banks operating in other 
developing countries, notably the United Kingdom and the United States.  Failing to 
curtail such charges has been viewed by consumer protection advocates as a “right to 
gouge”4  
 This article will consider possible permutations of the bank machine 
withdrawal fee regulation, namely, the selective imposition of the measure against 
certain types of banking institutions, possibly in relation to the size of their assets or 
the precise amount of service charge imposed.  It must be emphasized from the outset 
that there is no indication that this is actively in the contemplation of the Ministry of 
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Finance, so in that sense the arguments presented herein are purely speculative. Of 
primary concern is the effect that such potential restrictions may have upon foreign 
banks authorized by the Federal Bank Act to operate branches in Canada, of which 
there are currently 22, most of which have their home branches in the United States.5  
Any measure which encroaches on the provision of a service that has an international 
element accordingly raises issues relating to Canada’s commitment under the GATS.  
It is these commitments to which we will now turn. 
 
III GATS GENERAL OBLIGATIONS- MOST FAVOURED NATION 
The GATS is perhaps the most complex potentially wide ranging of the WTO 
Agreements.  As part of the WTO collection of agreements the GATS aims to achieve 
free trade in services by reducing the regulatory barriers on services that cross 
borders.  Penetrating deeply in domestic regulation, GATS affords wide protection to 
multi-national businesses, such as banks, which trade services, as defined in Article I 
(2) by one of the four modes of supply.  The third mode of supply, Commercial 
Presence, is relevant for the purposes of this article: GATS obligations apply to 
services by a service supplier of one WTO Member through commercial presence in 
the territory of any other Member.  The GATS itself does not define Financial 
Services, but Annex on Financial Services to the agreement defines Financial Services 
to include, inter alia, banking services.6 GATS will thus apply to the regulation of a 
foreign bank which operates a branch in Canada.  Article II of the Annex on Financial 
Services permits Members to establish prudential regulatory measures to protect 
investors in order to ensure the integrity of the financial system – an authorization that 
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contemplates the basic functioning of the system and consequently has limited scope.7  
While the concept of a prudential measure should evolve over time, it is suffused with 
an obligation of good faith to prevent abuse.8  The prudential measure exception 
would not encompass price restrictions on particular banking services. 
 The possibility that the bank service charge elimination will apply to some 
banks and not other (e.g. should the regulation only apply to the largest banks) or 
potentially the location of the automated machine (e.g. should the regulation only 
apply to automated machines in affluent areas) could violate the Most Favoured 
Nation obligation under GATS Article II if banks which have their home branch in 
different Member states are treated differently.  This article prohibits discrimination 
between like service and service suppliers from different countries and General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’) jurisprudence suggests that the “effect” of 
a measure will include incidental effects – harm to a member that may not have been 
intended.9  “Likeness” is not defined in GATS but principles drawn from GATT may 
be helpful.  Consequently likeness should include the general features of the service, 
how it is classified by the United Nations, as well as potentially consumer habits and 
preferences.   As automated bank machines share the same primary feature, that they 
dispense cash, it is not difficult to conclude that they are substantially “like”, 
irrespective of the bank with which they are affiliated.   
The Panel in EC Bananas established also that entities providing “like” 
services should be considered “like” suppliers10, which has been criticized as an 
overly broad concept of likeness in that it is focused entirely on the characteristic of 
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the service itself while ignoring completely the characteristics of the supplier.11 In a 
strict sense, small banks and large banks are not truly “like” service suppliers.  The 
value of a deposit held in a bank is linked to that bank’s performance over time: more 
successful banks are able to provide higher rates of interest.12 Well-established 
providers are not like new market entrants of foreign origin13 because well-established 
providers may depend less on service charges than new market entrants therefore 
might be deserving of different treatment.  The confusion over likeness in relation to 
services is multiplied when one considers that the underlying transaction through an 
automated bank machine is for the provision of goods (namely cash) and the service 
aspect is merely an accessory, a situation that is outside the GATS concept of trade in 
services.14  The GATS’ inadequate classification scheme has been criticized for 
exacerbating problems with core and incidental services.15  However, measures can be 
simultaneously challenged under both GATS and GATT as they are both part of the 
WTO Agreement, although the Appellate Body in Canada – Periodicals avoided 
deciding how to deal with products that are simultaneously goods and services16.  
Admittedly it would be difficult to envisage bank machine withdrawals as goods 
transactions, as cash is only a means of facilitating further transactions rather than 
something which can itself be consumed and also because the cash in question already 
belongs to the consumer.  As such bank withdrawals would not be within the scope of 
GATT.  
                                               
11
 Zdouc at 333 
12
 Trachtman at 67 
13
 Zdouc at 333. 
14
 The failure of GATS to encompass trade in services in association with trade in goods is examined in 
greater detail by A Abu-Akeel, “Definitions of Trade in Services Under the GATS: Legal Implications” 
32 George Washington Journal of Law and Economy 189 at 192-196.  See also C Thomas  ABOVE 
NOTE X at 327 and TREBILCOCK AND HOWSE AT 349. 
15
 A Matoo and S Wunsch-Vincent, “Pre-Empting Protectionism in Services: The GATS and 
Outsourcing” 7 J International Economic L 765 at 774-778.   
16
 WT/DS31/AB/R par 19 (magazines as goods and advertisement as a service). 
 6 
The fundamental issue to be kept in mind is that according to GATS case law 
which, as noted above, focuses on the nature of the service rather than the nature of 
the supplier, banks of all sizes and all sizes and types of assets which offer automated 
cash withdrawal are comparable for the purposes of GATS.  Thus there is significant 
potential to engage the aforementioned Most Favoured Nation obligation, as well as 
the Specific Obligations of National Treatment and Market Access, which we will 
now examine. 
 
IV GATS SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS – NATIONAL TREATMENT AND 
MARKET ACCESS 
The GATS contains specific obligations meaning that they are only engaged if a 
Member has made specific commitments in that sector.  These highly qualified rules 
embrace National Treatment, which has been described as the “core” of GATS17, and 
Market Access. Canada’s Schedule of Commitments lists Financial Services and does 
not contain any restrictions such as those regarding service charges and consequently 
the GATS specific obligations apply and must be considered when any measure is 
taken that may affect the international provision of these services.  Canada’s current 
exemptions under its Scheduled Commitments involve primarily constraints on 
foreign ownership of banking institutions.  
Again it should be emphasized that the withdrawal fee measure as planned 
should not contravene the National Treatment obligation of Article XVII (prohibiting 
discrimination between the treatment of foreign and domestic suppliers in such a way 
that foreign suppliers face competitive disadvantages) as there is no indication that the 
measure will be applied to foreign banks and not to domestic ones.  It appears as 
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though the measure is primarily intended to regulate fees charged by Canada’s six 
largest domestic banks.  However, should select domestic banks be exempt, perhaps 
because of their smaller capital holdings, the government must ensure that foreign 
banks of similar size (and thus “likeness”) enjoy the same exemptions from the 
regulation.  Indeed, “better than National Treatment” may be necessary to allow free 
trade in services where the application of the domestic regulation would 
inappropriately deter or foreign entry or undermine competitive opportunities.18  This 
preference for substantive rather than formal National Treatment could entitle a 
foreign bank to an exemption from the withdrawal fee prohibition on its bank 
machines to allow it to gain a foothold in the Canadian banking market dominated by 
domestic institutions.  Trachtman has summarized this cogently: 
 
..regulation that has non-trade purposes may affect foreign service providers 
differently than domestic providers that have grown accustomed to local regulation, 
have structured their affairs optimally in light of local regulation …the cumulative 
application of host …state regulation may dampen the competitiveness of foreign 
service providers.19 
 
In contrast to this view, footnote 10 to Article XVII on National Treatment states that 
a Member’s National Treatment commitment does not require it to “compensate for 
any inherent competitive disadvantages which result from the foreign character of the 
relevant service or service suppliers.” However a restrictive interpretation of this 
footnote was taken by the Panel in Canada – Autos which held that the footnote “does 
not provide cover for actions which might modify the conditions of competition 
against services or service suppliers which are already disadvantaged due to their 
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foreign character.”20 Such a disadvantage could be consumer’s unfamiliarity with a 
foreign bank’s name or brand.  Consequently there may be room to suggest that any 
measures which harm foreign banks to a greater degree than domestic banks could 
contravene Canada’s National Treatment obligation. 
 Of greater concern is Canada’s specific Market Access obligation for 
Financial Services as outlined in Article XVI of GATS.  This is an obligation for each 
Member to proactively open up its markets to permit entry of foreign suppliers.  
Accordingly Article XVI(2)(b) prohibits: limitations on the total value of service 
transactions or assets in the form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an 
economic needs test.  A prohibition on withdrawal charges is a limit on the total value 
of service transactions (the value limit on withdrawal transactions is zero).  Should the 
withdrawal fees be permitted in higher income areas (or only prohibited in low 
income areas) this would amount to an economic needs test.  It is important to 
recognize that for such a measure to transgress the Market Access commitment it 
need not be discriminatory (inconsistenly applied to foreign and domestic suppliers) – 
non-discriminatory barriers of this kind are also impermissible.21  The potential for 
non-discriminatory measures to transgress commitments is seen in the text of the  
the Understanding on Commitments in Financial services, which formed part of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations and outlined a framework to the liberalization of trade in 
financial services as alternative to Part III of the GATS.  The Understanding is not 
binding on every WTO Member, only those who voluntarily adhered to it, including 
Canada and most members of the OECD.  Article 10 of the Understanding requires a 
commitment from a Member to “endeavour to remove or limit any significant adverse 
effects on financial service suppliers of any other Member” and specifically lists 
                                               
20
 CANADA AUTOS CITE PARA 10.300 
21
 Van den Bossche at 483. 
 9 
“non-discriminatory measures that prevent financial service providers from offering 
in the Member’s territory, in the form determined by the Member, all the financial 
services permitted by the Member.”22 A withdrawal fee prohibition against both 
domestic and foreign banks may be a prima facie neutral barrier but they have a 
discriminatory effect because new entrants will suffer more than established 
businesses and new entrants are likely to be foreign providers.23 Thus it could be 
argued that well-established foreign banks may not actually be harmed any more than 
domestic ones.  Newer foreign entrants, for example banks from Eastern European 
states, could still suffer from this regulation, particularly when one considers that such 
banks might be more reliant on their service charges from Canadian clients than a 
large Canadian bank would be.  It has been suggested that negotiations leading up to 
the Agreement on Financial Services, which focused on crystallizing pre-existing 
liberalization, were lacking with respect to the introduction of competition through 
new entrants24 and perhaps this mentality has persisted in the mindset of domestic 
financial regulators.  Of course, any negative effects on new entrants would have to be 
demonstrated through a full review of the market situation, as indicated by the 
Appellate Body in Canada- Automotive Industry.25  Evidentiary problems associated 
with evaluating the particular situation of each private operator have been noted by 
Zdouc, who has also suggested that representative samples might be acceptable.26 
Still, it is at least probable that as Canada has undertaken Market Access 
commitments with respect to Financial Services, then it cannot maintain a restriction 
that limits the value that a bank may charge for a particular service. 
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 Van den Bossche has suggested, without explanation, that price controls which 
impose minimum or maximum prices on services would not constitute a market 
access barrier.27  It is far from clear that this is an accurate viewpoint.  We can take 
from this theory that whether a measure will be regulated by XVII:2 may depend on 
the precise way in which it is phrased.  If the regulation establishes that no withdrawal 
charges are permissible then it might survive a strict analysis, however if the measure 
limits a bank’s total revenue from automated service charges then it would transgress 
GATS.  Thus it is conceivable that Canada could achieve its consumer protection 
objective in a non trade-violative way.  Delimatsis urges that the restrictions in 
subparagraph XVI:2 will be applicable as long as the measure is in some way 
quantitative, irrespective of whether a number is actually used.28  The measure need 
not be explicitly cardinal, as long as it is descriptively so.  Thus measures which 
incorporate words like “none” or “all” or even “some” would fall within the purview 
of that section.   
 
V  EXCEPTIONS 
General exceptions to GATS obligations are included under Article XIV for measures 
that protect public morals; public order; health of humans, animals or plants; the 
prevention of fraud and protection of privacy; the collection of taxes and national 
security.  The only plausible exception for bank machine withdrawal fee prohibition is 
public order.  Banking services have been viewed by some as “essential services” 
similar to heat, electricity and phones29 and consequently any barrier to them is an 
affront to the proper functioning of society.  This is particularly so as more than a 
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third of Canadians have reported that automated banking machines are their principle 
means of conducting financial transactions.30  Accordingly sectors of society such as 
those with low incomes, students and the disabled might be seen as especially 
vulnerable to high banking fees. In a similar ideological vein, domestic control of the 
banking system, and with it the economy, is a vital component of a nation’s 
sovereignty.31 Consequently the ability to regulate bank’s operating within one’s 
territory should fall within the sphere of public order. 
 However the footnote to Article XIV explains that the public order exception 
may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one 
of the fundamental interests of society.  This appears to be a very high threshold and 
consequently it is unlikely that a minor financial burden to most elements of society 
would engage the public order exception.  The public order exception was 
successfully invoked in the US – Measures Affecting Gambling32 decision – the 
control of gambling was seen as a key aspect of public morals and public order by the 
WTO Panel and the Appellate Body.  However the Appellate Body refused to permit 
the exception to operate as it was applied in a discriminatory fashion.  GATT caselaw 
on these exceptions (which are substantially similar to those under GATS) may be 
also be illustrative and suggests that “necessary” means that the measure must be an 
“indispensable” means of achieving the objective, although this will be decided on a 
case by case basis.33   
 There are several important reasons why automated bank withdrawal 
machines are not an essential service and they can all be generally categorized under 
the heading of consumer choice.  If there is a viable alternative to using the service, 
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then the service cannot be classified as essential such that the public order exemption 
can be invoked.  First, clients of banks are free to withdraw cash from bank branches 
in person, which although perhaps not as convenient as automated machines that can 
be found throughout the city and are open constantly, do offer the same service.  Thus 
the issue is really one of convenience, and it is difficult to argue that convenience, 
meaning here same service with less effort, could possibly withstand judicial scrutiny 
as an “indispensable” exemption from an international treaty obligation. The 
Canadian Banker’s Association notes that 75% of cash machine withdrawals do not 
result in service charges because they are by customers using their own banks.  Using 
these higher-fee machines most often represent convenience in the form of mere 
metres of walking distance to a bank machine of the consumer’s own bank.  Avoiding 
inconvenience of this nature is not essential.  While cash itself is debatably essential 
(credit and debit cards have rendered it largely redundant) easy storage and retrieval 
of it is not.  The popularity of banks that impose no service charges and maintain no 
automated withdrawal machines, such as ING Direct, is testimony to this. 
 The “essential” nature of the automated withdrawal service is further 
fallacious because there are other ways in which machine withdrawal charges can be 
avoided (other than using one’s own bank). The most obvious of these is to make 
fewer withdrawals of larger quantities – indeed most banks have a small number of 
free withdrawals per month that might be termed “essential” withdrawals.  
Withdrawals beyond those exempted transactions could well be viewed as superficial 
or luxury withdrawals. Consumers can also obtain cash back on debit card purchases 
in stores. Again, convenient access to cash is itself a service distinct from the value 
obtained from a simple bank account in isolation (such as security and interest 
payments).  The Canadian Banker’s Association has observed that cash withdrawal 
 13 
machines not operated by the banks themselves (so-called White Label machines) that 
are found frequently in stores and which charge even higher service charges have 
become incredibly popular – demonstrating that Canadians are willing to pay for the 
convenience of easy access to cash.34  This convenience is provided at cost to the 
banks, who have commented that there is a significant expense in maintaining a 
network of machines.  The banking industry has reportedly spent more than $30 
million investing in technology to deliver automated services to customers.35 
 Finally, while it was not intended that this article examine bank withdrawal 
fees from a contract law perspective, it should be noted that there are no provisions 
regarding maximum prices for goods or services in any provincial consumer 
protection legislation.36  Moreover, there is international precedent, for example under 
the European Community Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 
establishing that the evaluation of the price of a good or service is outside the scope of 
a court’s discretion when assessing the fairness of contractual terms.37 The common 
law has also shown that the availability of an alternative for the consumer – many 
examples of which have been suggested above – is strongly indicative of equal 
bargaining power and therein legal validity of contractual terms.38  Of course, one of 
the primary concerns with bank service charges is that consumers are not aware of 
them suggesting that greater transparency requirements be imposed upon banks, a 
consideration which is also outside the scope of this article. 
 Even if the elimination of service charges were to fit under an extremely 
generous interpretation of public order, the exception would still need to satisfy the 
chapeau of Article XIV which requires that the measure not constitute a disguised 
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restriction on trade in services.  This contemplates not the specific content of the 
measure, but the manner in which it is applied – it cannot be applied in a way that 
abuses the enumerated exceptions.39  There is no GATS caselaw on the application of 
this requirement, but a similarly worded provision can be found in GATT where case 
law has suggested that this requirement is meant to prevent an abuse of the Article 
XIV exceptions, ensuring that a balance be struck between the regulatory rights of the 
Member and its international duties.40  The purpose of the bank service charge clearly 
does not aim to interfere with the international trade of financial services and in that 
sense an attempt to invoke the public order exception should not rightly be seen as an 
abuse of the exception, however this caution underlines that the exceptions will be 
scrutinized vigorously.  Additionally, the text of the chapeau and the US-Gambling 
decision urge that for an exception to be valid, all WTO consistent alternatives must 
be explored first in order to achieve the least trade-restrictive measure that fulfils the 
policy exception and this may include negotiations with Members41.  Eliminating 
other bank service charges, such as those associated with banking in person in a 
branch have been debated, however these other service fee eliminations have been 
contemplated in conjunction with withdrawal fee removal, not in place of them and  
(FOOTNOTE NEWS ARTICLE), there is no indication that this was conducted via 
international negotiation with a view to limiting trade restrictions on foreign banks.   
Additionally, it is difficult to argue that the goal of regulating the banking industry, 
and accordingly ensuring the integrity of the domestic economy, is an aspect of public 
order as withdrawal fees represent a miniscule portion of bank’s revenues, generally 
estimated at approximately 5% of their total revenues. Certainly there would be more 
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effective alternatives. With all these considerations in mind the regulatory elimination 
of bank service charges would probably not be saved by one of the GATS exceptions. 
 
VI  CONCLUSION 
GATS is a very broad and complex agreement that provides enormous protection to 
multinational corporations and the Canadian federal government must be mindful of 
its international obligations under this agreement when implementing any restrictions 
on bank’s ability to impose service charges to automated bank machine withdrawals.  
Depending on what form these restrictions ultimately take, if any, Canada may 
transgress one or more of the Most Favoured Nation, National Treatment and Market 
Access provisions of GATS, particularly if the restriction is not imposed universally.  
Even with the goal of consumer protection in mind, it is unlikely that any 
discriminatory effects suffered by ubiquitous foreign banks would survive through 
GATS exceptions, most notably because of the large degree of consumer choice that 
remains available to those who use bank machines.  One of the underlying purposes 
of the GATS’ Commercial Presence category is to liberalize foreign direct investment 
and any hindrance of that aim must be approached with extreme caution.  At a 
foundational level while denying domestic consumers benefit of a costless service, 
this measure represents a potential assault on international free enterprise and 
accordingly a violation of GATS.  It is an aphorism that GATS is less concerned with 
consumers than it is with producers, and perhaps this is a flaw of the WTO regime 
itself, but until that is corrected, Canada’s obligations under it must continue to colour 
our domestic policies.   
 
